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Abstract. Wildlife conservation organizations task rangers to deter and capture
wildlife poachers. Since rangers are responsible for patrolling vast areas, adver-
sary behavior modeling can help more effectively direct future patrols. In this
innovative application track paper, we present an adversary behavior modeling
system, INTERCEPT (INTERpretable Classification Ensemble to Protect Threat-
ened species), and provide the most extensive evaluation in the AI literature of
one of the largest poaching datasets from Queen Elizabeth National Park (QENP)
in Uganda, comparing INTERCEPT with its competitors; we also present results
from a month-long test of INTERCEPT in the field. We present three major con-
tributions. First, we present a paradigm shift in modeling and forecasting wildlife
poacher behavior. Some of the latest work in the AI literature (and in Conserva-
tion) has relied on models similar to the Quantal Response model from Behav-
ioral Game Theory for poacher behavior prediction. In contrast, INTERCEPT
presents a behavior model based on an ensemble of decision trees (i) that more
effectively predicts poacher attacks and (ii) that is more effectively interpretable
and verifiable. We augment this model to account for spatial correlations and
construct an ensemble of the best models, significantly improving performance.
Second, we conduct an extensive evaluation on the QENP dataset, comparing 41
models in prediction performance over two years. Third, we present the results
of deploying INTERCEPT for a one-month field test in QENP - a first for ad-
versary behavior modeling applications in this domain. This field test has led to
finding a poached elephant and more than a dozen snares (including a roll of ele-
phant snares) before they were deployed, potentially saving the lives of multiple
animals - including elephants. 6
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1 Introduction
Wildlife crime continues to be a global crisis as more animal species are hunted toward
extinction [33, 29]. Species extinction has dire consequences on ecosystems and the lo-
cal and national economies that depend on them (e.g., eco-tourism, ecosystem services).
To combat this trend, wildlife conservation organizations send well-trained rangers to
patrol in protected conservation areas to deter and capture poachers and also to con-
fiscate any tools used for illegal activities that they find. At many sites, rangers collect
observation data on animals, poachers, and signs of illegal activity. Given the magni-
tude of the wildlife poaching problem and the difficulty of the patrol planning prob-
lem, patrol managers can benefit from tools that analyze data and generate forecasts of
poacher attacks - the focus of this paper. In working with real-world wildlife crime data,
this innovative application paper illustrates the importance of research driven by data
from the field and real-world trials. This work potentially introduces a paradigm shift
in showing how adversary modeling ought to be done for deployed security games [30,
8], particularly in domains such as green security games [11, 15, 23, 20], where data is
sparse compared to settings such as urban crime [40, 1]. Security games have received
significant attention at AAMAS [17, 16, 22, 2, 15], and past work in security games has
often focused on behavioral models that are learned from and tested in human subject
experiments in the laboratory, which provides a large amount of attacker choice data
over a small number of targets [38, 25, 15]. The Quantal Response model is one exam-
ple that models boundedly rational attackers’ choices as a probability distribution via a
Logit function [38]. However, the wildlife crime domain introduces a set of real-world
challenges (e.g., rangers collect limited, noisy data over a large number of targets with
rich target features) that require behavior modeling efforts to not only focus more on
real-world data and less on laboratory data, but also not rely on plentiful attack data.
Outperforming previous laboratory-developed models [38, 25], CAPTURE [24] is
a two-layered model, developed using real-world wildlife poaching data, that incorpo-
rates key insights and addresses the challenges present in wildlife crime data. CAP-
TURE’s top layer attempts to predict the “attackability” of different targets, essentially
providing predictions of poacher attacks. The bottom observation layer predicts how
likely an attack that has occurred would be observed given the amount of patroller
coverage (also known as effort). CAPTURE models the attackability layer as a hidden
layer and uses the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm to learn parameters for
both layers simultaneously. Moreover, CAPTURE also contains a Dynamic Bayesian
Network, allowing it to model attacker behavior as being temporally dependent on past
attacks. The CAPTURE model, the current state-of-the-art in the wildlife crime do-
main, represents a level of complexity not previously seen in behavior modeling in the
security game literature.
While the focus of CAPTURE is on the observation layer’s performance (i.e., “Where
will patrollers observe past poaching attacks given their patrol effort?”), our focus is on
forecasting where future attacks will happen and thus we are interested in the attack-
ability layer’s predictions and performance (e.g., “Where will poachers attack next?”).
However, CAPTURE’s attackability predictions would sometimes predict too many tar-
gets to be attacked with a high probability and would thus have poor performance, as
discussed in more detail later in the paper. Given that CAPTURE embodied the latest in
modeling adversary behavior in this domain, our first attempt focused on three different
enhancements to CAPTURE: replacement of the observation layer with a simpler layer
adapted from [6] (CAPTURE-LB), modeling attacker behavior as being dependent on
the defender’s historical coverage in the previous time step (CAPTURE-PCov), and fi-
nally, exponentially penalizing inaccessible areas (CAPTURE-DKHO). Unfortunately,
all of these attempts ended in failure.
While poor performance is already a significant challenge, there are two additional,
important shortcomings of CAPTURE and other complex models in this same family.
First, CAPTURE’s learning process takes hours to complete on a high-performance
computing cluster - unacceptable for rangers in Uganda with limited computing power.
Second, CAPTURE’s learned model is difficult to interpret for domain experts since
it makes predictions based on a linear combination of decision factors; the values of
all its parameters’ feature weights (i.e., 10 weights and a free parameter for the attack
layer) need to be simultaneously accounted for in a single interpretation of poacher
preferences. These limitations and CAPTURE’s poor performance, the most recent in
a long line of behavioral game theory models, drove us to seek an alternative modeling
approach.
This paper presents INTERCEPT (INTERpretable Classification Ensemble to Pro-
tect Threatened species), a new adversary behavior modeling application, and its three
major contributions. (1) Given the limitations of traditional approaches in adversary
behavior modeling, INTERCEPT takes a fundamentally different modeling approach,
decision trees, and delivers a surprising result: although decision trees are simpler
and do not take temporal correlations into account, they perform significantly better
than CAPTURE (a complex model that considers temporal relationships), its variants,
and other popular machine learning models (e.g., Logistic Regression, SVMs, and
AdaBoost). Furthermore, decision trees satisfy the fundamental requirement of inter-
pretability; without an interpretable model, relevant authorities would not test INTER-
CEPT in the field, thus completely defeating the spirit of innovative applications re-
search. However, decision trees do not take into account the spatial correlations present
in this dataset, and we introduce a spatially aware decision tree algorithm, BoostIT, that
significantly improves recall with only modest losses in precision. To further augment
INTERCEPT’s performance, we construct an ensemble of the best classifiers which
boosts predictive performance to a factor of 3.5 over the existing CAPTURE model.
(2) These surprising results raise a fundamental question about the future of complex
behavioral models (e.g., Quantal Response based security game models [38, 25, 24]) in
real-world applications. To underline the importance of this question, we conduct the
most extensive empirical evaluation to date of the QENP dataset with an analysis of
41 different models and a total of 193 model variants (e.g., different cost matrices) and
demonstrate INTERCEPT’s superior performance to traditional modeling approaches.
(3) As a first for adversary behavior modeling applications applied to the wildlife crime
domain, we present the results of a month long real-world deployment of INTERCEPT:
compared to historical observation rates of illegal activity, rangers that used INTER-
CEPT observed 10 times the number of findings than the average. In addition to many
signs of trespassing, rangers found a poached elephant, a roll of elephant snares, and a
cache of 10 antelope snares before they were deployed (pictures in Figure 1). Each con-
fiscated snare represents an animal’s life saved; while the rangers’ finding of a poached
elephant carcass is a grim reminder that poachers are active, these successful snare con-
fiscations demonstrate the importance of real-world data in developing and evaluating
adversary behavior models.
Fig. 1: Campfire ashes and snare found by rangers directed by INTERCEPT. Photo credit: Uganda
Wildlife Authority ranger
2 Related Work
There have been recent efforts on planning effective patrol strategies to combat poach-
ing [11, 10], which have led to a project, PAWS, being deployed in the field. Previously,
the focus of PAWS has been on generating risk-based randomized patrols and not on
predicting poacher attacks. INTERCEPT’s predictive analysis is essential to efficiently
allocating limited ranger patrolling resources and can thus be the driving force for fur-
ther prescriptive analysis (i.e., patrol planning). Additionally, the deployment of our
work in the field has shown a level of success that has not been previously seen in
PAWS. As such, INTERCEPT is now part of the overall PAWS project as a predictive
analytics module.
Models inspired by previous work in behavioral game theory [21, 26, 4, 31] have
been extensively used in recent years to predict human behavior in simultaneous-move
games [34–36] and also to predict adversary behavior in multiple security game do-
mains including counter-terrorism [25], wildlife crime [37, 15, 24], fisheries protection
[12, 3], and even in urban crime [41, 1, 39] where a Dynamic Bayesian Network sim-
ilar to CAPTURE was used. Furthermore, researchers in the conservation community
have also used two-layered behavioral models similar to CAPTURE to predict future
poaching behavior [5]. CAPTURE is only the latest model in a long chain of behavioral
models used for human behavior prediction in game theory and also in the conserva-
tion literature. However, as detailed in later sections, CAPTURE suffers from several
limitations and performs poorly in predicting attacks in the real-world wildlife crime
dataset.
Modeling and predicting other agents’ behavior has also been studied in applica-
tion domains such as RoboCup and military operations [19, 32], but such predictions
are often based on real-time information, which is not available in this particular prob-
lem or dataset. There have been other attempts to predict poacher behavior in Machine
Learning research: [28] uses association rule mining to get a single rule that classifies
locations with poaching attack, but the expressiveness of this approach is limited due
to the single rule; [27] uses standard classification algorithms to predict the attackabil-
ity of targets and uses a regression model to predict attack probability. However, this
work only reports accuracy, which is not an informative metric given the extreme class
imbalance present in real-world wildlife crime datasets (i.e., just predicting no attacks
everywhere could lead to high accuracy) and the potentially high cost of false negatives
(i.e., an endangered animal may be poached). Moreover, our decision tree based model
can be seen as a generalization of this work since we can view a set of rules (instead of
just one) that describe the model in richer terms than a single rule.
3 Wildlife Crime Dataset
The following discussion is on wildlife crime data collected over 13 years at the Queen
Elizabeth National Park (QENP) in Uganda. QENP (Figure 2) is a wildlife conservation
area covering 1,978 square kilometers. Among their many duties, wildlife park rangers
there conduct foot patrols to monitor wildlife habitat, apprehend any poachers sighted
inside the park, and collect data on animal signs and signs of illegal human activity.
Fig. 2: QENP
3.1 Dataset Challenges
Because this is a real-world geospatial crime dataset, it is important to understand the
inherent challenges in analyzing its contents, such as nonlinear relationships between
features [14]. Additionally, data can only be collected in areas that are patrolled, and
even in the areas that are patrolled, poaching signs may remain undetected. This occurs
because poaching signs (such as snares) are often well-hidden, and rangers may need
to conduct a thorough patrol in order to detect any attack – an infeasible task to un-
dertake for all targets all the time due to limited patrolling resources. This real-world
constraint not only leads to uncertainty in the negative class labels (i.e., when poaching
signs are not observed we are uncertain whether an attack actually happened at the cor-
responding target or not) but also results in a small number of positive samples being
recorded in the dataset thus creating a huge class imbalance. As such, it is necessary
to evaluate the attack prediction model’s performance with metrics that account for this
uncertainty, such as those for Positive and Unlabeled Learning (PU Learning) [18], and
are discussed in more detail in the following sections.
3.2 Dataset Composition
The entire QENP area was discretized into 1 square kilometer grid cells (total 2,522
cells), each as a potential target of poaching. For each target, the ranger patrol effort
level (i.e., coverage) and observed illegal human activity signs (e.g., poached animal
carcasses, snares) were recorded. In addition, each target is associated with a non-static
average ranger patrol effort value and a set of static features (that are constant through-
out the entire time period): terrain features such as habitat (the terrain type and relative
ease of travel) and terrain slope; distances to nearby roads, water bodies, patrol posts,
and villages; and animal density.
For the following analysis, we examine poaching data from 2003-2015. We aim to
find the targets that are liable to be attacked since predicting the attackability of targets
can guide future patrols. We assume a target is attackable if an attack is ever observed
at that target at any point in time. Therefore, when creating training sets, we combine
observations from the entire training period for each target and label it as attackable if
any observations were made.
Given the uncertainty in negative labels, there are bound to be training and test-
ing samples that contradict one another. We consider a sample in the training set and
a sample in the testing set to be contradictory when they have the same combination
of static domain features values (e.g., terrain, distances, animal density) and non-static
patrol coverage amount (i.e., low or high coverage) but different class labels (attacked
or not attacked). These contradictions introduce additional noise in evaluating the per-
formance of learned models and would thus cause any model to perform poorly on said
contradictory data. As such, we remove these contradictions, about 10% of the data,
from testing sets.
4 CAPTURE and Proposed Variants
The natural first step towards predicting future poaching attacks based on our real-world
wildlife crime dataset was to use the best previous model, CAPTURE [24]. CAPTURE
was shown to have superior predictive performance to a number of other standard mod-
els in the behavioral game theory literature (e.g., Quantal Response (QR) [38], Subjec-
tive Utility Quantal Response (SUQR) [25]).
To make attackability predictions, we discretized the protected area into a set of
targets I . Each target i ∈ I has a set of domain-specific features xi ∈ x such as
animal density di and distance to water. In a given time period t, a target i will be
patrolled/covered by rangers with probability ct,i.
CAPTURE consists of a two-layered behavior model. CAPTURE’s first layer, the
attackability layer, computes the probability that a poacher will attack a given target
i at time step t. Similar to SUQR, which has been used to describe human players’
stochastic choice of actions in security games, CAPTURE predicts attacks based on
a linear combination of domain features xt,i, ranger coverage probability ct,i at the
current time step t, and whether the target was attacked in the previous time step at−1,i.
With this last feature, at−1,i, CAPTURE models attacker behavior as being temporally
dependent on past attacks.
p(at,i = 1|at−1,i, ct,i, xt,i) = e
λᵀ[at−1,i,ct,i,xt,i,1]
1 + eλ
ᵀ[at−1,i,ct,i,xt,i,1]
(1)
λ is a parameter vector representing the importance of the features.
CAPTURE’s second layer, the observation layer, computes the probability that rangers
will observe an attack if poachers did attack that patrolled area based on a subset of do-
main features (e.g., habitat and slope) xˆt,i and ranger coverage probability ct,i.
p(ot,i = 1|at,i = 1, ct,i, xˆt,i) = ct,i × e
ωᵀ[xˆt,i,1]
1 + eω
ᵀ[xˆt,i,1]
(2)
ω is a parameter vector that measures how domain features impact observation prob-
ability. The model parameters (λ, ω) that can maximize the likelihood of observations
are estimated via the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm.
However, CAPTURE has a few limitations that lead to poor predictive performance
in its attackability layer. First, CAPTURE’s attackability predictions would sometimes
predict too many targets to be attacked with a high probability (e.g., 80% of the tar-
gets will be attacked with almost 100% probability), leading to poor performance (see
Section 7). One explanation is CAPTURE’s parameter learning algorithm focuses on
maximizing the performance of the observation layer rather than on the attackability
layer. As the observation layer acts as a filter for the attackability layer, CAPTURE’s
learning process will converge to solutions that obtain decent performance for the ob-
servation layer even if the attackability layer’s performance is poor.
Therefore, we propose several novel variants of CAPTURE as attempts to improve
its predictions. In an attempt to restrict the degrees of freedom in the observation layer,
and thus restrict the values the attackability layer can take in the learning process, we
propose CAPTURE-LB which replaces the observation layer with a simpler observa-
tion layer, adapted from [6], described as follows:
p(ot,i = 1|at,i = 1, ct,i) = 1− e−β×ct,i (3)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the parameter that estimates the detection efficiency. This not only
provides a straightforward way of assessing the performance of patrol effort to observa-
tions but also has a smaller chance of overfitting, due to fewer parameters. For a given
attack probability p(at,i = 1), the unconditional probability of observing an attack at
target i at time step t is given by:
p(ot,i) = p(at,i = 1)× p(ot,i = 1|at,i = 1, ct,i) (4)
Second, CAPTURE’s attackability layer assumes that poachers plan attacks based
on the patrol coverage in the current time step, which may not be realistic in the real
world as the poachers may not get up-to-date information about the current patrol strat-
egy and thus would rely on historical patrol coverage instead [11]. Therefore, we pro-
pose another variant of CAPTURE, CAPTURE-PCov, that learns based on the pre-
vious time step’s patrol coverage instead of the current time step’s patrol coverage
(Equation 5). Similarly, we propose CAPTURE-PCov-LB, a model that uses the at-
tackability layer of CAPTURE with previous coverage as a feature but instead uses the
LB observation layer defined in Equation 3.
p(at,i = 1|at−1,i, ct−1,i, xt,i) = e
λᵀ[at−1,i,ct−1,i,xt,i,1]
1 + eλ
ᵀ[at−1,i,ct−1,i,xt,i,1]
(5)
Finally, CAPTURE’s attackability predictions fail to take into account the domain
knowledge that inaccessible and unattractive areas of the park will not be attacked with
high probability, and we thus propose another variant CAPTURE-DKHO, which is the
same as CAPTURE-PCov-LB except that it exponentially penalizes the attractiveness
of inaccessible areas (Equation 6).
p(at,i = 1|at−1,i, ct−1,i, xt,i) = e
λᵀ[at−1,i,ct−1,i,x′t,i,1]
1 + eλ
ᵀ[at−1,i,ct−1,i,x′t,i,1]
(6)
x′ corresponds to the linear combination of features x but with the modified habitat
feature σ′i = −σieσi which heavily penalizes high habitat values (i.e., hard to access
areas).
5 INTERCEPT
The attempts of using the best previous model CAPTURE and the more complex vari-
ants of CAPTURE, proposed to address the limitations of CAPTURE, all suffered from
poor attackability prediction performance as shown in Section 7. The natural progres-
sion then would have been to pursue more complex models in this behavioral game
theory family of models with the expectation that they would improve performance on
our real-world data. However, as reported in [24], complex models such as CAPTURE
and its variants incur heavy computational costs; it takes approximately 6 hours for
these models to complete execution. In addition, these models become more difficult
to interpret when the dimensionality of the feature space increases (e.g., more numer-
ical values to simultaneously account for in a single interpretation). We wanted to use
models that would address all of these shortcomings by, not only significantly reduc-
ing computational costs so as to be usable by rangers with limited computing power
in Uganda, but also remain interpretable to domain experts as the feature space dimen-
sionality increases. All of these factors pointed against using more complex behavioral
models. Therefore, we break from the current trend in behavior modeling in security
games and model adversary behavior in terms of decision tree-based behavior models,
even though we were initially skeptical about its predictive capabilities. Surprisingly,
this simpler approach led to significant improvements in performance over the prior
state-of-the-art (i.e., CAPTURE).
5.1 BoostIT
A binary decision tree D is trained on a set Θ of independent variables x (the domain
features), a dependent variable o (attack observations), and outputs a binary classifica-
tion Di for each target i: {not attacked (Di = 0), attacked (Di = 1)}. A decision tree’s
negative predictions for a test set Ψ are denoted by P−Ψ (D) and positive predictions by
P+Ψ (D) (i.e., vectors of binary predictions).
Crime hot spots are part of a well-known theory in Criminology [9] that views
crime as an uneven distribution; crime is likely to be concentrated in particular areas
called hot spots. If a particular geographic area has a high concentration of predicted
attacks, it is reasonable to interpret these predictions as a hot spot prediction (i.e., pre-
dicting a high concentration of crime). While CAPTURE explicitly models attacks as a
probability distribution decided by a linear combination of feature values and thus can
implicitly represent the hot spots with soft boundaries in the geographic space, decision
trees’ rules with hard boundaries in the feature space would lead to fine-grained seg-
mentations in the geographic space and is thus less capable of representing hot spots.
As such, we designed the Boosted decision tree with an Iterative learning algorithm
(henceforth referred to as BoostIT) (Algorithm 1), where proximity to a predicted hot
spot is encoded as an additional input feature.
Algorithm 1 BoostIT
D0 ← LEARNDECISIONTREE(Θ0)
repeat
hΘ ← CALCHOTSPOTPROXIMITY(PΘm−1(Dm−1), α)
hΨ ← CALCHOTSPOTPROXIMITY(PΨm−1(Dm−1), α)
Θm ← ADDFEATURE(Θ0, hΘ)
Ψm ← ADDFEATURE(Ψ0, hΨ )
Dm ← LEARNDECISIONTREE(Θm)
m = m+ 1
until iterationStoppingLevelReached
return P
D0 is the initial decision tree learned without the hot spot proximity feature h,
and Θ0 and Ψ0 correspond to the initial training and test sets, respectively. For each
level of iteration m, a feature hΘ (and hΨ ) is computed for each target i ∈ I that
corresponds to whether that target is close to a predicted hot spot in the training (and
test sets); for example, if a target i ∈ PΘm−1(Dm−1) is adjacent to α or more targets
in P+Θm−1(D
m−1) (i.e., targets that are predicted to be positive), then hΘi = 1. We then
re-learn the decision tree at each iteration m with a feature augmented dataset Θm. As
an example, BoostIT may add a feature to a target i that i is near a hot spot if there are
two adjacent targets that are predicted to be attackable. In the next iteration, this new
feature (“near a hot spot”) will get used in learning about predicting attacks on i. This
continues until an iteration criterion is reached. Note that the test set Ψ is not used while
learning new decision trees (only training data Θ is used) and is only used to update the
test set prediction PΨ . In the rest of the paper, we will refer to BoostIT with an α as
BoostIT-αNearestNeighbors (or BoostIT-αNN). With this algorithm, the final decision
treeDm would generally predict more positive predictions with concentrated areas (i.e.,
hot spots) compared toD0, but the set of predictions ofDm is not necessarily a superset
of the set of predictions of D0.
Although we are primarily interested in predicting attackability, we can also predict
where patrollers would observe attacks by cascading attackability predictions with the
LB observation layer (Equation 3). We convert the unconditional observation probabil-
ity, derived from the cascaded model (Equation 4), to binary predictions by classifying
samples as observed/not observed based on whether they are above or below the mean
respectively.
5.2 INTERCEPT: Ensemble of Experts
We investigated the predictions of the traditional decision tree and BoostIT and ob-
served that they are diverse in terms of their predictions. Here, by diversity, we mean
that they predict attacks at a variety of targets. Therefore, while one model may fail to
correctly classify a particular target as attacked, another model may succeed. This in-
dicates the ability of different models to correctly learn and predict on different regions
of the feature space. For example, let us consider the following three models: (i) Deci-
sionTree, (ii) BoostIT-3NN and (iii) BoostIT-2NN. While computing pairwise disagree-
ment between the models’ attackability predictions, we observed that: (i) DecisionTree
and BoostIT-3NN disagree on 105 out of 2211 target samples; (ii) DecisionTree and
BoostIT-2NN disagree on 97 out of 2211 samples; and (iii) BoostIT-3NN and BoostIT-
2NN disagree on 118 out of 2211 samples. This observation led us to consider com-
bining the best decision tree and BoostIT based models, thus forming INTERCEPT–an
ensemble of experts.
Because of uncertainty in negative labels, INTERCEPT considers not only decision
tree models with the standard false positive (FP) cost of one, but also decision trees with
various FP costs. For a decision tree with FP cost of 0.6, during the learning process,
the decision tree will not receive the full penalty of 1 but will instead receive a penalty
of 0.6 for each false positive prediction it makes.
In INTERCEPT, each expert model voted for the final attack prediction on a par-
ticular target. We considered three types of voting rules to determine whether a target
should be predicted to be attacked by the ensemble: (a) majority of the experts predict
an attack; (b) all experts predict an attack; and (c) any one expert predicts an attack.
INTERCEPT uses the best voting rule: majority.
We considered ensembles with three and five experts. Having at most 5 experts
makes the ensemble easily interpretable. In other words, the final prediction at a target
is due to only 5 decision rules at a maximum, and it is easy to walk the human domain
experts through the 5 rules in a way that the logic is easily verified.
6 Evaluation Metrics
To evaluate INTERCEPT and other models, we first prepared two separate train/test
splits on the dataset. For one dataset, we trained on data from 2003 to 2013 and evalu-
ated our models on data in 2014, and for the other dataset, we trained on data from 2003
to 2014 and evaluated on data from 2015. Prior to discussing the evaluation results, we
briefly discuss the metrics we use for computing our performance on predicting attack-
ability and observed attacks.
Any metric to evaluate targets’ attackability in domains such as wildlife poach-
ing must account for the uncertainty in negative class labels. Therefore, in addition to
standard metrics (Precision, Recall, and F1-score) that are used to evaluate models on
datasets where there is no uncertainty in the underlying ground truth, we also evaluate
our models with a metric that accounts for the uncertainty present in our dataset. The
metric introduced in [18], henceforth referred to as L&L, is an appropriate metric since
it is specifically designed for models learned on Positive and Unlabeled (PU) datasets
(i.e., datasets with uncertain negative labels). L&L is defined in equation 7, where r
denotes the recall and Pr[f(Te) = 1] denotes the probability of a classifier f mak-
ing a positive class label prediction. We compute Pr[f(Te) = 1] as the percentage of
positive predictions made by our model on a given test set.
L&L(D,Te) =
r2
Pr[f(Te) = 1]
(7)
As we are certain about the positive samples in our dataset, L&L rewards a classifier
more for correctly predicting where attacks have occurred (i.e., positive labels). How-
ever, it also prevents models from predicting attacks everywhere, via its denominator,
and ensures that the model is selective in its positive predictions.
We also evaluate the models in terms of observation predictions. Here, we report
standard metrics (Precision, Recall, and F1-score). We also compute the area under the
Precision-Recall curve (PR-AUC). PR-AUC is a more appropriate metric for evaluating
models on datasets with severe class imbalance [7] compared to area under the ROC
curve. When there are many more negative points than positive points, the model can
make many false positive predictions and the false positive rate would still be low, and
thus, the ROC curve becomes less informative. In contrast, precision better captures
how well the model is making correct positive predictions given a small number of
positive examples. L&L is no longer used to evaluate the observation probability model
as there is no uncertainty in terms of the observations, i.e., we either observed or did
not observe an attack, and we are measuring the model’s ability to predict whether we
will observe attacks at already attacked targets.
7 Evaluation on Historical Real-world Patrol Data
To compare INTERCEPT with its competitors, we conducted a thorough investigation
of the performance of 41 different models and 193 variants (a detailed list is available
in the online appendix 7). This is one of the largest evaluation efforts on a real-world
dataset in the wildlife crime domain, and we compared INTERCEPT against the pre-
vious best model CAPTURE, its variants, and other machine learning approaches such
as Support Vector Machines (SVM), AdaBoosted Decision Trees, and Logistic Regres-
7 http://teamcore.usc.edu/papers/AAMAS2017 Ensemble Appendix.pdf
Classifier Type F1 L&L PrecisionRecall
PositiveBaseline 0.06 1 0.03 1
UniformRandom 0.05 0.51 0.03 0.50
CAPTURE 0.31 3.52 0.25 0.39
CAPTURE-PCov 0.13 1.29 0.08 0.48
CAPTURE-PCov-LB 0.08 0.87 0.04 0.58
CAPTURE-DKHO 0.10 1.05 0.06 0.67
INTERCEPT 0.41 5.83 0.37 0.45
Table 1: Attackability Prediction Results on 2014 Test Data
sion8. All the numbers highlighted in bold in the tables indicate the results of the best
performing models in that table. The best performing INTERCEPT system is an ensem-
ble of five decision trees with majority voting. The five decision trees are: a standard
decision tree, two BoostIT decision trees (m = 1) with α = 2 and α = 3 respectively,
and two decision trees with modified false positive costs 0.6 and 0.9 respectively. Note
that, due to data collection methodology changes in 2015, the distribution of attack data
in 2015 is significantly different than all other previous years; 2015 is a difficult dataset
to test on when the training dataset of 2003-2014 represents a different distribution of
attack data, and we will demonstrate this impact in the following evaluation.
7.1 Attackability Prediction Results
In Tables 1 and 2, we show a comparison of the performance between our best IN-
TERCEPT system (the five decision tree ensemble with majority voting), the current
state-of-the-art CAPTURE, its variants, and other baseline models towards accurately
predicting the attackability of targets in QENP for years 2014 and 2015, respectively.
The PositiveBaseline corresponds to a model that predicts every target to be attacked
(p(at,i) = 1;∀i, t), and the UniformRandom corresponds to the baseline where each
target is predicted to be attacked or not attacked with equal probability. Note that, in
this subsection, when evaluating two-layered models such as CAPTURE and its vari-
ants, we are examining the performance of just the attackability layer output, and we
defer the evaluation of the observation predictions to Section 7.2. Since we evaluate
the attackability predictions of our models on metrics for binary classification, the real-
valued output of the attackability layer of CAPTURE and its variants were converted
to a binary classification where probabilities greater than or equal to the mean attack
probability were classified as positive.
We make the following observations from these tables: First, INTERCEPT com-
pletely outperforms the previous best model CAPTURE and its variants, as well as other
baseline models in terms of L&L and F1 scores. For 2014, INTERCEPT outperforms
CAPTURE in terms of precision, recall, F1, and L&L score. For 2015 test data, IN-
TERCEPT represents an even larger performance increase by approximately 3.50 times
8 Note that due to data confidentiality agreements, we are unable to show an example decision
tree in this paper.
Classifier Type F1 L&L PrecisionRecall
PositiveBaseline 0.14 1 0.07 1
UniformRandom 0.19 0.50 0.11 0.50
CAPTURE 0.21 1.08 0.13 0.63
CAPTURE-PCov 0.19 0.87 0.11 0.57
CAPTURE-PCov-LB 0.18 0.69 0.11 0.46
CAPTURE-DKHO 0.20 0.71 0.12 0.5
INTERCEPT 0.49 3.46 0.63 0.41
Table 2: Attackability Prediction Results on 2015 Test Data
(L&L score of 3.46 vs 1.08) over CAPTURE and even more so for CAPTURE-PCov
(L&L score of 3.46 vs 0.87). CAPTURE-PCov doesn’t even outperform the positive
baseline. Second, CAPTURE performs better on the 2014 dataset (when the training
and testing data were similarly distributed) than on the 2015 dataset. In contrast, IN-
TERCEPT remained flexible enough to perform well on the difficult 2015 testing set.
However, CAPTURE-PCov, the more realistic variant of CAPTURE that can actually
be used for forecasting, fails to make meaningful predictions about the attackability of
targets. Its similar performance to PositiveBaseline demonstrates the need for models
to learn the attackability of targets independently of observation probability to avoid
learning models that make incorrect inferences about the attackability of the park (e.g.,
the entire park can be attacked). This is particularly important in the wildlife poaching
domain because, due to the limited number of security resources, rangers cannot pa-
trol every target all the time. Therefore, the attack probability model’s predictions need
to be extremely precise (high precision) while also being useful indicators of poach-
ing activities throughout the park (high recall). Third, CAPTURE-PCov-LB performs
even worse than CAPTURE-PCov in terms of L&L score for these attackability pre-
dictions, although the only difference between the two models is the observation layer.
This occurs because the attackability prediction layer and the observation layer are not
independent of one another; with the EM algorithm, the parameters are being learned
for both layers simultaneously. In addition, by incorporating domain knowledge and
penalizing the unattractive areas, CAPTURE-DKHO unfortunately does not lead to a
significant improvement in performance. Fourth, INTERCEPT’s precision values are
significantly better compared to CAPTURE-PCov in 2014 and both CAPTURE and
CAPTURE-PCov in 2015 with only modest losses of recall, indicating a significant
reduction in the number of false positive predictions made throughout the park.
In Tables 3 and 4, we also compare INTERCEPT with other models including: (i)
a decision tree where each sample was weighted based on the patrol intensity for the
corresponding target (Weighted Decision Tree); (ii) the best performing SVM; (iii) Lo-
gistic Regression (which predicted no attacks and thus metrics could not be computed);
and (iv) the best performing AdaBoosted Decision Tree. INTERCEPT provides signif-
icantly better performance than these other models as well.
Classifier Type F1 L&L PrecisionRecall
Weighted DecisionTree 0.11 1.01 0.06 0.48
SVM-BestFPCost-0.3 0.13 1.18 0.46 0.45
Logistic Regression - - - 0
AdaBoostDecisionTree-
BestFPCost-0.2
0.13 1.22 0.07 0.48
INTERCEPT 0.41 5.83 0.37 0.45
Table 3: Additional Attackability Prediction Results on 2014 Test Data
Classifier Type F1 L&L PrecisionRecall
Weighted DecisionTree 0.25 1.42 0.15 0.69
SVM-BestFPCost-0.25 0.19 0.72 0.12 0.43
Logistic Regression - - - 0
AdaBoost-DT-
BestFPCost-0.15
0.21 0.86 0.13 0.49
INTERCEPT 0.49 3.46 0.63 0.41
Table 4: Additional Attackability Prediction Results on 2015 Test Data
7.2 Observation Prediction Results
Tables 5 and 6 correspond to how accurately each model predicted the observations in
our test datasets. For a fair comparison, we also cascade the attackability predictions
of the PositiveBaseline and UniformRandom baselines with an LB observation layer,
and convert those unconditional observation probabilities to binary predictions with a
mean threshold, as was done for CAPTURE’s attackability predictions. We observe the
following. First, incorporating the observation model in Equation 4 improved the PR-
AUC score of CAPTURE in both test datasets (for 2014, 0.36 vs 0.33; for 2015, 0.32 vs
0.29). Second, INTERCEPT outperforms the other models by a large margin, both in
terms of F1 and PR-AUC, for both test datasets. Combined with the attackability results,
these results demonstrate the benefit of learning more precise attackability models in
order to better predict observation probability.
7.3 Impact of Ensemble and Voting Rules
INTERCEPT consists of five experts with a majority voting rule. We now investigate
the impact of combining different decision trees into an ensemble, and the impact of dif-
ferent voting rules. Tables 7 and 8 show that constructing an ensemble, INTERCEPT,
significantly improves the performance of the system as a whole, compared to the per-
formance of its individual decision tree and BoostIT members. The standard decision
tree is more conservative as it predicts less false positives, leading to higher precision,
but suffers from low recall.
Table 9 shows the impact that a voting rule has on performance on 2015 test data
(due to space, we omit the 2014 test data as it exhibits the same trends). We evaluate the
Classifier Type F1 PrecisionRecall PR-AUC
PositiveBaseline 0.13 0.07 0.79 0.12
UniformRandom 0.09 0.05 0.46 0.07
CAPTURE 0.14 0.08 0.73 0.33
CAPTURE-PCov 0.12 0.07 0.61 0.31
CAPTURE-PCov-
LB
0.13 0.08 0.48 0.36
CAPTURE-DKHO 0.16 0.09 0.72 0.33
INTERCEPT 0.36 0.32 0.89 0.45
Table 5: Observation Prediction Results on 2014 Test Data
Classifier Type F1 PrecisionRecall PR-AUC
PositiveBaseline 0.26 0.16 0.66 0.20
UniformRandom 0.19 0.12 0.45 0.14
CAPTURE 0.29 0.18 0.70 0.29
CAPTURE-PCov 0.29 0.18 0.70 0.29
CAPTURE-PCov-LB 0.34 0.21 0.85 0.32
CAPTURE-DKHO 0.36 0.24 0.79 0.32
INTERCEPT 0.50 0.65 0.41 0.49
Table 6: Observation Prediction Results on 2015 Test Data
performances of the best ensemble compositions, with three and five experts for each
voting rule. We observe that: (i) Ensembles which predict an attack if any one expert
predicts an attack (Any) are significantly better in terms of recall (0.68), but do poorly
in terms of precision (0.23). This is because such ensembles are more generous in terms
of predicting an attack, and this leads to a significantly higher number of false positives;
(ii) Ensembles with a voting rule where all experts have to agree (All) perform worse
in terms of recall (0.16), but do best in terms of precision (0.89) as it makes less posi-
tive predictions (both true positives as well as false positives). This would mean that it
would miss a lot of attacks in our domain, however; (iii) The majority voting based en-
sembles (Maj), used by INTERCEPT, provide an important balance between precision
(0.63) and recall (0.41) as they are neither extremely conservative nor generous in terms
of their predictions and therefore outperform other voting rules significantly (L&L of
3.46).
This analysis provides important guidance for selecting ensembles depending on the
requirements of the domain. For example, if it is extremely crucial to predict as many
true positives as possible and a high number of false positives is acceptable, then using
an Any voting method would be beneficial. However, in our wildlife poaching prediction
problem, we have limited security resources and therefore cannot send patrols to every
target all the time. Therefore, we not only wish to limit the number of false positives
but also increase the number of correct poaching predictions. The majority voting rule
provides this important balance in our domain.
Classifier Type F1 L&L PrecisionRecall
PositiveBaseline 0.06 1 0.03 1
DecisionTree 0.2 1.8 0.14 0.36
BoostIT-1NN 0.19 2.23 0.12 0.55
BoostIT-2NN 0.21 2.13 0.13 0.45
BoostIT-3NN 0.2 2.01 0.13 0.45
INTERCEPT 0.41 5.83 0.37 0.45
Table 7: Attackability Prediction Results For Decision Tree Models on 2014 Test Data
Classifier Type F1 L&L PrecisionRecall
PositiveBaseline 0.14 1 0.07 1
DecisionTree 0.39 2.01 0.39 0.38
BoostIT-1NN 0.39 2.16 0.32 0.50
BoostIT-2NN 0.37 2.00 0.30 0.50
BoostIT-3NN 0.42 2.45 0.35 0.52
INTERCEPT 0.49 3.46 0.63 0.41
Table 8: Attackability Prediction Results For Decision Tree Models on 2015 Test Data
8 Evaluation on Real-World Deployment
INTERCEPT represents a paradigm shift from complex logit-based models such as
CAPTURE [24], and many others, to decision tree-based models. During development,
we worked with a domain expert from the Wildlife Conservation Society to improve
and validate our decision tree models and their corresponding predictions. Indeed, one
advantage of shifting to a decision tree-based approach (as opposed to methods like
CAPTURE) is that the underlying rules can be easily expressed to experts in non-AI
fields.
After this development and evaluation on historical data was completed, we de-
ployed INTERCEPT to the field. Based on INTERCEPT’s predictions, we chose two
patrol areas for QENP rangers to patrol for one month. We selected these areas (approx-
imately 9 square km each) such that they were (1) predicted to have multiple attacks
and (2) previously infrequently patrolled as rangers did not previously consider these as
important as other areas (and thus are good areas to test our predictions). After provid-
ing the rangers with GPS coordinates of particular points in these areas, they patrolled
these areas on foot and utilized their expert knowledge to determine where exactly in
these areas they were most likely to find snares and other signs of illegal human ac-
tivity (e.g., salt licks, watering holes). On each patrol, in addition to their other duties,
rangers recorded their observations of animal sightings (i.e., 21 animals were sighted in
one month) and illegal human activity.
We now present our key findings in Tables 10 and 11 and provide a selection of pho-
tos in Figures 1 and 3. The most noteworthy findings of these patrols are those related
to elephant poaching; rangers, unfortunately, found one poached elephant with its tusks
removed. However, this result demonstrates that poachers find this area, predicted by
Classifier Type F1 L&L PrecisionRecall
BoostIT-3Experts-Any 0.36 2.11 0.26 0.59
BoostIT-5Experts-Any 0.34 2.13 0.23 0.68
BoostIT-3Experts-All 0.36 2.68 0.88 0.22
BoostIT-5Experts-All 0.28 1.97 0.89 0.16
BoostIT-3Experts-Maj 0.49 3.34 0.58 0.43
INTERCEPT 0.49 3.46 0.63 0.41
Table 9: Attackability Prediction Results For Different Ensembles on 2015 Test Data
our model, attractive for poaching. On a more positive note, our model’s predictions led
rangers to find many snares before they caught any animals: one large roll of elephant
snares, one active wire snare, and one cache of ten antelope snares. INTERCEPT’s
predictions assisted rangers’ efforts in potentially saving the lives of multiple animals
including elephants.
In addition to wildlife signs, which represent areas of interest to poachers, the find-
ings of trespassing (e.g., litter, ashes) are significant as these represent areas of the park
where humans were able to enter illegally and leave without being detected; if we can
continue to patrol areas where poachers are visiting, rangers will eventually encounter
the poachers themselves.
Week# Illegal Activity Count
2 Trespassing 19
3 Active Snares 1
Plant Harvesting 1
4 Poached Elephants 1
Elephant Snare Roll 1
Antelope Snares 10
Fish Roasting Racks 2
Table 10: Real World Patrol Results: Illegal Activity
So as to provide additional context for these results, we present a set of base rates
in Table 11. These base rates, computed in and around our proposed patrol areas, cor-
respond to the average number of observed crimes per month from 2003-2015. Animal
commercial (AnimalCom) crimes correspond to elephant, buffalo, and hippopotamus
poaching; animal noncommercial (AnimalNoncom) corresponds to all other poaching
and poaching via snares; and plant noncommercial (PlantNoncom) corresponds to il-
legal harvesting of non-timber forest products (e.g., honey). The percentile rank corre-
sponds to the number of months where our deployed patrols recorded more observations
than in the historical data. For animal noncommercial crime, there was an average of
0.73 attacks observed monthly; for our deployed patrols, there were 3 separate obser-
vations (such as a roll of elephant snares), and in 91% of the months from 2003-2015,
2 or fewer observations were recorded.
Fig. 3: Elephant snare roll found by rangers directed by INTERCEPT. Photo credit: Uganda
Wildlife Authority ranger
Crime Type INTERCEPT Average Percentile
AnimalCom 1 0.16 89%
AnimalNoncom 3 0.73 91%
Fishing 1 0.73 79%
PlantNoncom 1 0.46 76%
Trespassing 19 0.20 100%
Total 25 2.28
Table 11: Base Rate Comparison: Hits per Month
9 Lessons Learned
After our extensive modifications to the CAPTURE model and our subsequent evalua-
tion, it is important to identify the reasons why we obtained such a surprising result: de-
cision trees outperformed a complex, domain-specific temporal model. (1) The amount
of data and its quality need to be taken into consideration when developing a model. The
QENP dataset had significant noise (e.g., imperfect observations) and extreme class im-
balance. As such, attempting to develop a complex model for such a dataset can backfire
when there does not exist sufficient data to support it. Our decision tree approach, gen-
erally regarded as simpler, benefits from being able to express non-linear relationships
and can thus work with fewer data points. SVMs, also able to express non-linear rela-
tionships, appear to fail due to their complexity and attempt to define very fine-grained
divisions of the dataset. (2) Model interpretability is a necessity when working in the
real-world. Our decision tree model was deployed because, not only did it have superior
performance to CAPTURE, but it was also easy to directly look at the rules the decision
tree had learned and evaluate whether or not those rules were reasonable (according to
a domain expert). Thus, (3) the tradeoff between interpretability and performance, stud-
ied in domains where interpretability is key (e.g., biopharmaceutical classification) [13],
may not always exist. Indeed, the most interpretable model, out of all that we evaluated,
was also the best performing (by a large margin!); future research should (i) not always
forego interpretability in favor of performance under the assumption that there is al-
ways a tradeoff but (ii) instead be sure to investigate simpler, interpretable models in
case there isn’t a tradeoff.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we present INTERCEPT, a paradigm shift from complex logit-based mod-
els to simpler decision tree-based models. While the previous state-of-the-art, CAP-
TURE, represented the latest in a long line of behavioral game theory research, it suffers
from poor performance and other critical limitations that preclude its actual deployment
in the field. Indeed, in the process of conducting the most extensive empirical evaluation
in the AI literature of one of the largest poaching datasets, we show a surprising result:
INTERCEPT, based on a simpler model, significantly outperformed the more com-
plex CAPTURE model. Furthermore, decision trees were specifically chosen due to the
fundamental requirement of interpretability - a key limitation of previous logit-based
models such as CAPTURE. Additionally, as a first for behavior modeling applications
applied to this domain, we presented results from a month-long test of our model by
rangers in QENP where rangers found and confiscated an active snare and almost a
dozen additional snares, including multiple elephant snares, before they were deployed.
Given that the rangers also found a poached elephant, their finding and confiscating of
new elephant snares before they were deployed is significant; this research has poten-
tially saved the lives of elephants and other animals in QENP. Rangers in QENP are
continuing patrols based on INTERCEPT, and we are generating patrols for a QENP-
wide experiment to assess the effectiveness of our approach in a more diverse range of
environments.
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